Substructural type systems provide the ability to speak about resources . By enforcing usage restrictions on inputs to computations they allow programmers to reify limited system units–such as memory–in types. We demonstrate a new form of resource reasoning founded on constraining outputs and explore its utility for practical programming. In particular, we identify a number of disparate programming features explored largely in the security literature as various fragments of our unified framework. These encompass capabilities, quantitative information leakage, sandboxing in the style of the Linux seccomp interface, authorization protocols, and more. We furthermore explore its connection to conventional input-based resource reasoning, casting it as an internal treatment of the constructive Kripke semantics of substructural logics. We verify the capability, quantity, and protocol safety of our system through a single logical relations argument. In doing so, we take the first steps towards obtaining the ultimate multitool for security reasoning.

Information flow control is a long-studied approach for establishing non-interference properties of programs. For instance, it can be used to prove that a secret does not interfere with some computation, thereby establishing that the former does not leak through the latter. Despite their potential as a holy grail for security reasoning and their maturity within the literature, information flow type systems have seen limited adoption. In practice, information flow specifications tend to be excessively complex and can easily spiral out of control even for simple programs. Additionally, while non-interference is well-behaved in an idealized setting where information leakage never occurs, most practical programs must violate non-interference in order to fulfill their purpose. Useful information flow type systems in prior work must therefore contend with a definition of non-interference extended with declassification, which often offers weaker modular reasoning properties. We introduce structural information flow, which both illuminates and addresses these issues from a logical viewpoint. In particular, we draw on established insights from the modal logic literature to argue that information flow reasoning arises from hybrid logic, rather than conventional modal logic as previously imagined. We show with a range of examples that structural information flow specifications are straightforward to write and easy to visually parse. Uniquely in the structural setting, we demonstrate that declassification emerges not as an aberration to non-interference, but as a natural and unavoidable consequence of sufficiently general machinery for information flow. This flavor of declassification features excellent local reasoning and enables our approach to account for real-world information flow needs without compromising its theoretical elegance. Finally, we establish non-interference via a logical relations approach, showing off its simplicity in the face of the expressive power captured.

The Dependent Calculus of Indistinguishability (DCOI) uses dependency tracking to identify irrelevant arguments and uses indistinguishability during type conversion to enable proof irrelevance, supporting run-time and compile-time irrelevance with the same uniform mechanism. DCOI also internalizes reasoning about indistinguishability through the use of a propositional equality type indexed by an observer level. As DCOI is a pure type system, prior work establishes only its syntactic type safety, justifying its use as the basis for a programming language with dependent types. However, it was not clear whether any instance of this system would be suitable for use as a type theory for theorem proving. Here, we identify a suitable instance DCOI ω , which has an infinite predicative universe hierarchy. We show that DCOI ω is logically consistent, normalizing, and that type conversion is decidable. We have mechanized all results using the Coq proof assistant.

In type systems with dependency tracking, programmers can assign an ordered set of levels to computations and prevent information flow from high-level computations to the low-level ones. The key notion in such systems is indistinguishability : a definition of program equivalence that takes into account the parts of the program that an observer may depend on. In this paper, we investigate the use of dependency tracking in the context of dependently-typed languages. We present the Dependent Calculus of Indistinguishability (DCOI), a system that adopts indistinguishability as the definition of equality used by the type checker. DCOI also internalizes that relation as an observer-indexed propositional equality type, so that programmers may reason about indistinguishability within the language. Our design generalizes and extends prior systems that combine dependency tracking with dependent types and is the first to support conversion and propositional equality at arbitrary observer levels. We have proven type soundness and noninterference theorems for DCOI and have developed a prototype implementation of its type checker.

We present the Flow-Limited Authorization First-Order Logic (FLAFOL), a logic for reasoning about authorization decisions in the presence of information-flow policies. We formalize the FLAFOL proof system, characterize its proof-theoretic properties, and develop its security guarantees. In particular, FLAFOL is the first logic to provide a non-interference guarantee while supporting all connectives of first-order logic. Furthermore, this guarantee is the first to combine the notions of non-interference from both authorization logic and information-flow systems. All the theorems in this paper are proven in Coq.