Formally verifying system properties is one of the most effective ways of improving system quality, but its high manual effort requirements often render it prohibitively expensive. Tools that automate formal verification by learning from proof corpora to synthesize proofs have just begun to show their promise. These tools are effective because of the richness of the data the proof corpora contain. This richness comes from the stylistic conventions followed by communities of proof developers, together with the powerful logical systems beneath proof assistants. However, this richness remains underexploited, with most work thus far focusing on architecture rather than on how to make the most of the proof data. This article systematically explores how to most effectively exploit one aspect of that proof data: identifiers. We develop the Passport approach, a method for enriching the predictive Coq model used by an existing proof-synthesis tool with three new encoding mechanisms for identifiers: category vocabulary indexing, subword sequence modeling, and path elaboration. We evaluate our approach’s enrichment effect on three existing base tools: ASTactic, Tac, and Tok. In head-to-head comparisons, Passport automatically proves 29% more theorems than the best-performing of these base tools. Combining the three tools enhanced by the Passport approach automatically proves 38% more theorems than combining the three base tools. Finally, together, these base tools and their enhanced versions prove 45% more theorems than the combined base tools. Overall, our findings suggest that modeling identifiers can play a significant role in improving proof synthesis, leading to higher-quality software.

Development of formal proofs of correctness of programs can increase actual and perceived reliability and facilitate better understanding of program specifications and their underlying assumptions. Tools supporting such development have been available for over 40 years, but have only recently seen wide practical use. Projects based on construction of machine-checked formal proofs are now reaching an unprecedented scale, comparable to large software projects, which leads to new challenges in proof development and maintenance. Despite its increasing importance, the field of proof engineering is seldom considered in its own right; related theories, techniques, and tools span many fields and venues. This survey of the literature presents a holistic understanding of proof engineering for program correctness, covering impact in practice, foundations, proof automation, proof organization, and practical proof development.

Compilers should be correct. To improve the quality of C compilers, we created Csmith, a randomized test-case generation tool, and spent three years using it to find compiler bugs. During this period we reported more than 325 previously unknown bugs to compiler developers. Every compiler we tested was found to crash and also to silently generate wrong code when presented with valid input. In this paper we present our compiler-testing tool and the results of our bug-hunting study. Our first contribution is to advance the state of the art in compiler testing. Unlike previous tools, Csmith generates programs that cover a large subset of C while avoiding the undefined and unspecified behaviors that would destroy its ability to automatically find wrong-code bugs. Our second contribution is a collection of qualitative and quantitative results about the bugs we have found in open-source C compilers.

This paper reports on the development and formal verification (proof of semantic preservation) of CompCert, a compiler from Clight (a large subset of the C programming language) to PowerPC assembly code, using the Coq proof assistant both for programming the compiler and for proving its correctness. Such a verified compiler is useful in the context of critical software and its formal verification: the verification of the compiler guarantees that the safety properties proved on the source code hold for the executable compiled code as well.