Reference. ZIPNet: Low-bandwidth anonymous broadcast from (dis)Trusted Execution Environments
Anonymous Broadcast Channels (ABCs) allow a group of clients to announce messages without revealing the exact author. Modern ABCs operate in a client-server model, where anonymity depends on some threshold (e.g, 1 of 2) of servers being honest. ABCs are an important application in their own right, e.g., for activism and whistleblowing. Recent work on ABCs (Riposte, Blinder) has focused on minimizing the bandwidth cost to clients and servers when supporting large broadcast channels for such applications. But, particularly for low bandwidth settings, they impose large costs on servers, make cover traffic costly, and make volunteer operators unlikely. In this paper, we describe the design, implementation, and evaluation of ZipNet, an anonymous broadcast channel that: 1) scales to hundreds of anytrust servers by minimizing the computational costs of each server, 2) substantially reduces the servers’ bandwidth costs by outsourcing the aggregation of client messages to untrusted (for privacy) infrastructure, and 3) supports cover traffic that is both cheap for clients to produce and for servers to handle.
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