We seek to enable more flexible use of rich specifications in a variety of ways that smoothly extend conventional software development practice. We show how a single specification language, based on separation logic to capture the subtle ownership disciplines of systems code, can be used for runtime assertion checking, for property-based testing, and for formal machine-checked proof—and how each of these complements and supports the others. We demonstrate all this on a challenging example: a component of a production hypervisor, running both stand-alone at user level and in situ in the hypervisor.

Differential privacy is the standard method for privacy-preserving data analysis. The importance of having strong guarantees on the reliability of implementations of differentially private algorithms is widely recognized and has sparked fruitful research on formal methods. However, the design patterns and language features used in modern DP libraries as well as the classes of guarantees that the library designers wish to establish often fall outside of the scope of previous verification approaches. We introduce a program logic suitable for verifying differentially private implementations written in complex, general-purpose programming languages. Our logic has first-class support for reasoning about privacy budgets as a separation logic resource. The expressiveness of the logic and the target language allow our approach to handle common programming patterns used in the implementation of libraries for differential privacy, such as privacy filters and caching. While previous work has focused on developing guarantees for programs written in domain-specific languages or for privacy mechanisms in isolation, our logic can reason modularly about primitives, higher-order combinators, and interactive algorithms. We demonstrate the applicability of our approach by implementing a verified library of differential privacy mechanisms, including an online version of the Sparse Vector Technique, as well as a privacy filter inspired by the popular Python library OpenDP, which crucially relies on our ability to handle the combination of randomization, local state, and higher-order functions. We demonstrate that our specifications are general and reusable by instantiating them to verify clients of our library. All of our results have been foundationally verified in the Rocq Prover.

WasmFX is a proposed extension of Wasm, a low-level portable bytecode, with primitives for explicitly manipulating execution stacks as continuations. By exposing an interface of effect handlers, WasmFX enables non-local control flow features to be compiled in a modular way: one handcrafts a library that directly implements such features in WasmFX, and compilation then merely calls into the library. Alas, code involving non-local control flow is notoriously challenging, and so this proposal raises the questions of the soundness of the language extension, and of the correctness of such handcrafted libraries. In this paper, we first describe WasmFXCert, a mechanisation of WasmFX in Rocq, and prove the expected type soundness result. We then develop Iris-WasmFX, a program logic to reason about Wasm programs that use effect handlers, and illustrate its application to two key use cases of effect handlers: a coroutine library, and a generator. Together, these validate the design of WasmFX, and provide a modular framework for verifying future effect-based libraries.

Symbolic execution has emerged as a powerful technique for scaling exact probabilistic inference to languages with more expressive features. But, this expressivity comes at a price: probabilistic programming languages based on symbolic execution are difficult to debug, optimize, and prove correct due to the many intricacies inherent to high-performance symbolic execution strategies. We aim to make it easier to work with probabilistic symbolic executors by developing symbolic sets , a new semantic domain that cleanly captures the notion of computation underlying symbolic execution. Just as a symbolic executor replaces ordinary execution with a lifted semantics, symbolic set theory replaces ordinary set theory with a lifted mathematics : the category of symbolic sets is a Grothendieck topos, which allows type theory to be used as a metalanguage for working with symbolic sets and functions. We prove a metatheorem that shows how a large class of definitional interpreters written in the internal language of symbolic sets are automatically correct for their ordinary set-theoretic interpretations. Using this metatheorem, we give the first full correctness argument for a symbolic probabilistic language with higher-order functions, type-directed state merging, pattern matching, and structural recursion.

We present Foxtrot, the first higher-order separation logic for proving contextual refinement of higherorder concurrent probabilistic programs with higher-order local state. From a high level, Foxtrot inherits various concurrency reasoning principles from standard concurrent separation logic, e.g. invariants and ghost resources, and supports advanced probabilistic reasoning principles for reasoning about complex probability distributions induced by concurrent threads, e.g. tape presampling and induction by error amplification. The integration of these strong reasoning principles is highly non-trivial due to the combination of probability and concurrency in the language and the complexity of the Foxtrot model; the soundness of the logic relies on a version of the axiom of choice within the Iris logic, which is not used in earlier work on Iris-based logics. We demonstrate the expressiveness of Foxtrot on a wide range of examples, including the adversarial von Neumann coin and the randombytes_uniform function of the Sodium cryptography software library. All results have been mechanized in the Rocq proof assistant and the Iris separation logic framework.

A key feature in trusted computing is attestation, which allows encapsulated components (enclaves) to prove their identity to (local or remote) distrusting components. Reasoning about software that uses the technique requires tracking how trust evolves after successful attestation. This process is security-critical and non-trivial, but no existing formal verification technique supports modular reasoning about attestation of enclaves and their clients, or proving end-to-end properties for systems combining trusted, untrusted and attested code. We contribute Cerisier, the first program logic for modular reasoning about trusted, untrusted and attested code, fully mechanized in the Iris separation logic and the Rocq Prover. We formalize a recent proposal, CHERI-TrEE, to extend capability machines with enclave primitives, as an extension to the Cerise capability machine and program logic. Our program logic comes with a universal contract for untrusted code, which captures both capability safety and local enclave attestation. Like Cerise, this universal contract is phrased in terms of a logical relation defining capabilities’ authority. We demonstrate Cerisier by proving end-to-end properties for three representative applications of trusted computing: secure outsourced computation, mutual attestation and a modeled trusted sensor component.

We introduce weighted NetKAT, a domain-specific language for modeling and verifying quantitative quantitative network properties. The language is parametric on a semiring , enabling the treatment of a wide range of quantities in a uniform way. We provide a denotational semantics and an equivalent operational semantics, the latter based on a novel model of weighted NetKAT automata ( WNKA ) capturing the stateful behavior of our language. With WNKA , we obtain a class of generic decision procedures for reasoning about quantitative safety and reachability in a fully automatic way, even in the presence of possibly unbounded iteration. We demonstrate the applicability of our framework in a case study using Internet2’s Abilene network as the underlying topology.

Differential privacy (DP) has become the gold standard for privacy-preserving data analysis, but implementing it correctly has proven challenging. Prior work has focused on verifying DP at a high level, assuming either that the foundations are correct or that a perfect source of random noise is available. However, the underlying theory of differential privacy can be very complex and subtle. Flaws in basic mechanisms and random number generation have been a critical source of vulnerabilities in real-world DP systems. In this paper, we present SampCert, the first comprehensive, mechanized foundation for executable implementations of differential privacy. SampCert is written in Lean with over 12,000 lines of proof. It offers a generic and extensible notion of DP, a framework for constructing and composing DP mechanisms, and formally verified implementations of Laplace and Gaussian sampling algorithms. SampCert provides (1) a mechanized foundation for developing the next generation of differentially private algorithms, and (2) mechanically verified primitives that can be deployed in production systems. Indeed, SampCert’s verified algorithms power the DP offerings of Amazon Web Services, demonstrating its real-world impact. SampCert’s key innovations include: (1) A generic DP foundation that can be instantiated for various DP definitions (e.g., pure, concentrated, Rényi DP); (2) formally verified discrete Laplace and Gaussian sampling algorithms that avoid the pitfalls of floating-point implementations; and (3) a simple probability monad and novel proof techniques that streamline the formalization. To enable proving complex correctness properties of DP and random number generation, SampCert makes heavy use of Lean’s extensive Mathlib library, leveraging theorems in Fourier analysis, measure and probability theory, number theory, and topology.

We present Dependent Lambek Calculus (Lambek${\begin{array}{}\end{array}}^{𝙳}$), a domain-specific dependent type theory for verified parsing and formal grammar theory. In Lambek${\begin{array}{}\end{array}}^{𝙳}$, linear types are used as a syntax for formal grammars, and parsers can be written as linear terms. The linear typing restriction provides a form of intrinsic verification that a parser yields only valid parse trees for the input string. We demonstrate the expressivity of this system by showing that the combination of inductive linear types and dependency on non-linear data can be used to encode commonly used grammar formalisms such as regular and context-free grammars as well as traces of various types of automata. Using these encodings, we define parsers for regular expressions using deterministic automata, as well as examples of verified parsers of context-free grammars.

We present a denotational semantics of our type theory that interprets the linear types as functions from strings to sets of abstract parse trees and terms as parse transformers. Based on this denotational semantics, we have made a prototype implementation of Lambek${\begin{array}{}\end{array}}^{𝙳}$ using a shallow embedding in the Agda proof assistant. All of our examples parsers have been implemented in this prototype implementation.

We develop StacKAT, a network verification language featuring loops, finite state variables, nondeterminism, and—most importantly—access to a stack with accompanying push and pop operations. By viewing the variables and stack as the (parsed) headers and (to-be-parsed) contents of a network packet, StacKAT can express a wide range of network behaviors including parsing, source routing, and telemetry. These behaviors are difficult or impossible to model using existing languages like NetKAT . We develop a decision procedure for StacKAT program equivalence, based on finite automata. This decision procedure provides the theoretical basis for verifying network-wide properties and is able to provide counterexamples for inequivalent programs. Finally, we provide an axiomatization of StacKAT equivalence and establish its completeness.

NetKAT is a domain-specific programming language and logic that has been successfully used to specify and verify the behavior of packet-switched networks. This paper develops techniques for automatically learning NetKAT models of unknown networks using active learning. Prior work has explored active learning for a wide range of automata (e.g., deterministic, register, Büchi, timed etc.) and also developed applications, such as validating implementations of network protocols. We present algorithms for learning different types of NetKAT automata, including symbolic automata proposed in recent work. We prove the soundness of these algorithms, build a prototype implementation, and evaluate it on a standard benchmark. Our results highlight the applicability of symbolic NetKAT learning for realistic network configurations and topologies.

Exact probabilistic inference is a requirement for many applications of probabilistic programming languages (PPLs) such as in high-consequence settings or verification. However, designing and implementing a PPL with scalable high-performance exact inference is difficult: exact inference engines, much like SAT solvers, are intricate low-level programs that are hard to implement. Due to this implementation challenge, PPLs that support scalable exact inference are restrictive and lack many features of general-purpose languages. This paper presents Roulette, the first discrete probabilistic programming language that combines high-performance exact inference with general-purpose language features. Roulette supports a significant subset of Racket, including data structures, first-class functions, surely-terminating recursion, mutable state, modules, and macros, along with probabilistic features such as finitely supported discrete random variables, conditioning, and top-level inference. The key insight is that there is a close connection between exact probabilistic inference and the symbolic evaluation strategy of Rosette. Building on this connection, Roulette generalizes and extends the Rosette solver-aided programming system to reason about probabilistic rather than symbolic quantities. We prove Roulette sound by generalizing a proof of correctness for Rosette to handle probabilities, and demonstrate its scalability and expressivity on a number of examples.

One of the central claims of fame of the Coq proof assistant is extraction, i.e., the ability to obtain efficient programs in industrial programming languages such as OCaml, Haskell, or Scheme from programs written in Coq’s expressive dependent type theory. Extraction is of great practical usefulness, used crucially e.g., in the CompCert project. However, for such executables obtained by extraction, the extraction process is part of the trusted code base (TCB), as are Coq’s kernel and the compiler used to compile the extracted code. The extraction process contains intricate semantic transformation of programs that rely on subtle operational features of both the source and target language. Its code has also evolved since the last theoretical exposition in the seminal PhD thesis of Pierre Letouzey. Furthermore, while the exact correctness statements for the execution of extracted code are described clearly in academic literature, the interoperability with unverified code has never been investigated formally, and yet is used in virtually every project relying on extraction. In this paper, we describe the development of a novel extraction pipeline from Coq to OCaml, implemented and verified in Coq itself, with a clear correctness theorem and guarantees for safe interoperability. We build our work on the MetaCoq project, which aims at decreasing the TCB of Coq’s kernel by re-implementing it in Coq itself and proving it correct w.r.t. a formal specification of Coq’s type theory in Coq. Since OCaml does not have a formal specification, we make use of the Malfunction project specifying the semantics of the intermediate language of the OCaml compiler. Our work fills some gaps in the literature and highlights important differences between the operational semantics of Coq programs and their extraction. In particular, we focus on the guarantees that can be provided for interoperability with unverified code, and prove that extracted programs of first-order data type are correct and can safely interoperate, whereas for higher-order programs already simple interoperations can lead to incorrect behaviour and even outright segfaults.

Deep neural networks (DNNs) are becoming increasingly important components of software, and are considered the state-of-the-art solution for a number of problems, such as image recognition. However, DNNs are far from infallible, and incorrect behavior of DNNs can have disastrous real-world consequences. This paper addresses the problem of architecture-preserving V-polytope provable repair of DNNs. A V-polytope defines a convex bounded polytope using its vertex representation. V-polytope provable repair guarantees that the repaired DNN satisfies the given specification on the infinite set of points in the given V-polytope. An architecture-preserving repair only modifies the parameters of the DNN, without modifying its architecture. The repair has the flexibility to modify multiple layers of the DNN, and runs in polynomial time. It supports DNNs with activation functions that have some linear pieces, as well as fully-connected, convolutional, pooling and residual layers. To the best our knowledge, this is the first provable repair approach that has all of these features. We implement our approach in a tool called APRNN. Using MNIST, ImageNet, and ACAS Xu DNNs, we show that it has better efficiency, scalability, and generalization compared to PRDNN and REASSURE, prior provable repair methods that are not architecture preserving. CCS Concepts: • Computing methodologies → Neural networks; • Theory of computation → Linear programming; • Software and its engineering → Software post-development issues.

We present Lilac, a separation logic for reasoning about probabilistic programs where separating conjunction captures probabilistic independence. Inspired by an analogy with mutable state where sampling corresponds to dynamic allocation, we show how probability spaces over a fixed, ambient sample space appear to be the natural analogue of heap fragments, and present a new combining operation on them such that probability spaces behave like heaps and measurability of random variables behaves like ownership. This combining operation forms the basis for our model of separation, and produces a logic with many pleasant properties. In particular, Lilac has a frame rule identical to the ordinary one, and naturally accommodates advanced features like continuous random variables and reasoning about quantitative properties of programs. Then we propose a new modality based on disintegration theory for reasoning about conditional probability. We show how the resulting modal logic validates examples from prior work, and give a formal verification of an intricate weighted sampling algorithm whose correctness depends crucially on conditional independence structure.

Lexers and parsers are typically defined separately and connected by a token stream. This separate definition is important for modularity and reduces the potential for parsing ambiguity. However, materializing tokens as data structures and case-switching on tokens comes with a cost. We show how to fuse separately-defined lexers and parsers, drastically improving performance without compromising modularity or increasing ambiguity. We propose a deterministic variant of Greibach Normal Form that ensures deterministic parsing with a single token of lookahead and makes fusion strikingly simple, and prove that normalizing context free expressions into the deterministic normal form is semantics-preserving. Our staged parser combinator library, flap, provides a standard interface, but generates specialized token-free code that runs two to six times faster than ocamlyacc on a range of benchmarks.

Understanding and debugging the performance of distributed systems is a notoriously hard task, but a critical one. Traditional techniques like logging, tracing, and benchmarking represent a best-effort way to find performance bugs, but they either require a full deployment to be effective or can only find bugs after they manifest. Even with such techniques in place, real deployments often exhibit performance bugs that cause unwanted behavior. In this paper, we present Performal, a novel methodology that leverages the recent advances in formal verification to provide rigorous latency guarantees for real, complex distributed systems. The task is not an easy one: it requires carefully decoupling the formal proofs from the execution environment, formally defining latency properties, and proving them on real, distributed implementations. We used Performal to prove rigorous upper bounds for the latency of three applications: a distributed lock, ZooKeeper and a MultiPaxos-based State Machine Replication system. Our experimental evaluation shows that these bounds are a good proxy for the behavior of the deployed system and can be used to identify performance bugs in real-world systems.

File formats specify how data is encoded for persistent storage. They cannot be formalized as context-free grammars since their specifications include context-sensitive patterns such as the random access pattern and the type-length-value pattern. We propose a new grammar mechanism called Interval Parsing Grammars IPGs) for file format specifications. An IPG attaches to every nonterminal/terminal an interval, which specifies the range of input the nonterminal/terminal consumes. By connecting intervals and attributes, the context-sensitive patterns in file formats can be well handled. In this paper, we formalize IPGs’ syntax as well as its semantics, and its semantics naturally leads to a parser generator that generates a recursive-descent parser from an IPG. In general, IPGs are declarative, modular, and enable termination checking. We have used IPGs to specify a number of file formats including ZIP, ELF, GIF, PE, and part of PDF; we have also evaluated the performance of the generated parsers.

Modular design is a key challenge for enabling large-scale reuse of hardware modules. Unlike software, however, hardware designs correspond to physical circuits and inherit constraints from them. Timing constraints—which cycle a signal arrives, when an input is read—and structural constraints—how often a multiplier accepts new inputs—are fundamental to hardware interfaces. Existing hardware design languages do not provide a way to encode these constraints; a user must read documentation, build scripts, or in the worst case, a module’s implementation to understand how to use it. We present Filament, a language for modular hardware design that supports the specification and enforcement of timing and structural constraints for statically scheduled pipelines. Filament uses timeline types, which describe the intervals of clock-cycle time when a given signal is available or required. Filament enables safe composition of hardware modules, ensures that the resulting designs are correctly pipelined, and predictably lowers them to efficient hardware.

Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) have grown in popularity over the past decade and are now being used in safety-critical domains such as aircraft collision avoidance. This has motivated a large number of techniques for finding unsafe behavior in DNNs. In contrast, this paper tackles the problem of correcting a DNN once unsafe behavior is found. We introduce the provable repair problem, which is the problem of repairing a network N to construct a new network N′ that satisfies a given specification. If the safety specification is over a finite set of points, our Provable Point Repair algorithm can find a provably minimal repair satisfying the specification, regardless of the activation functions used. For safety specifications addressing convex polytopes containing infinitely many points, our Provable Polytope Repair algorithm can find a provably minimal repair satisfying the specification for DNNs using piecewise-linear activation functions. The key insight behind both of these algorithms is the introduction of a Decoupled DNN architecture, which allows us to reduce provable repair to a linear programming problem. Our experimental results demonstrate the efficiency and effectiveness of our Provable Repair algorithms on a variety of challenging tasks.

Parsers are security-critical components of many software systems, and verified parsing therefore has a key role to play in secure software design. However, existing verified parsers for context-free grammars are limited in their expressiveness, termination properties, or performance characteristics. They are only compatible with a restricted class of grammars, they are not guaranteed to terminate on all inputs, or they are not designed to be performant on grammars for real-world programming languages and data formats. In this work, we present CoStar, a verified parser that addresses these limitations. The parser is implemented with the Coq Proof Assistant and is based on the ALL(*) parsing algorithm. CoStar is sound and complete for all non-left-recursive grammars; it produces a correct parse tree for its input whenever such a tree exists, and it correctly detects ambiguous inputs. CoStar also provides strong termination guarantees; it terminates without error on all inputs when applied to a non-left-recursive grammar. Finally, CoStar achieves linear-time performance on a range of unambiguous grammars for commonly used languages and data formats.

In this paper, we present an efficient, functional, and formally verified parsing algorithm for LL(1) context-free expressions based on the concept of derivatives of formal languages. Parsing with derivatives is an elegant parsing technique, which, in the general case, suffers from cubic worst-case time complexity and slow performance in practice. We specialise the parsing with derivatives algorithm to LL(1) context-free expressions, where alternatives can be chosen given a single token of lookahead. We formalise the notion of LL(1) expressions and show how to efficiently check the LL(1) property. Next, we present a novel linear-time parsing with derivatives algorithm for LL(1) expressions operating on a zipper-inspired data structure. We prove the algorithm correct in Coq and present an implementation as a part of Scallion, a parser combinators framework in Scala with enumeration and pretty printing capabilities.

In this paper, we recall the definition of the context-free expressions (or µ-regular expressions), an algebraic presentation of the context-free languages. Then, we define a core type system for the context-free expressions which gives a compositional criterion for identifying those context-free expressions which can be parsed unambiguously by predictive algorithms in the style of recursive descent or LL(1). Next, we show how these typed grammar expressions can be used to derive a parser combinator library which both guarantees linear-time parsing with no backtracking and single-token lookahead, and which respects the natural denotational semantics of context-free expressions. Finally, we show how to exploit the type information to write a staged version of this library, which produces dramatic increases in performance, even outperforming code generated by the standard parser generator tool ocamlyacc.

Despite several decades of research, the problem of formal verification of infinite-state systems has resisted effective automation. We describe a system — Ivy — for interactively verifying safety of infinite-state systems. Ivy’s key principle is that whenever verification fails, Ivy graphically displays a concrete counterexample to induction. The user then interactively guides generalization from this counterexample. This process continues until an inductive invariant is found. Ivy searches for universally quantified invariants, and uses a restricted modeling language. This ensures that all verification conditions can be checked algorithmically. All user interactions are performed using graphical models, easing the user’s task. We describe our initial experience with verifying several distributed protocols.

Compilers should be correct. To improve the quality of C compilers, we created Csmith, a randomized test-case generation tool, and spent three years using it to find compiler bugs. During this period we reported more than 325 previously unknown bugs to compiler developers. Every compiler we tested was found to crash and also to silently generate wrong code when presented with valid input. In this paper we present our compiler-testing tool and the results of our bug-hunting study. Our first contribution is to advance the state of the art in compiler testing. Unlike previous tools, Csmith generates programs that cover a large subset of C while avoiding the undefined and unspecified behaviors that would destroy its ability to automatically find wrong-code bugs. Our second contribution is a collection of qualitative and quantitative results about the bugs we have found in open-source C compilers.