Most implementations of sampling algorithms for continuous distributions use floating-point numbers, which introduce round-off errors and approximations. These errors can be difficult to analyze, and can cause security issues when used in algorithms for differential privacy. An alternative is to use exact sampling algorithms based on computable reals, which can lazily generate the digits of a continuous sample to arbitrary precision. However, these algorithms are intricate, and implementing and using them involves a combination of semantically challenging language features, such as probabilistic choice, higher-order functions, and dynamically-allocated mutable state. In this paper we present Continuous-Eris, a higher-order separation logic for verifying the correctness of exact sampling algorithms for computable distributions. To demonstrate Continuous-Eris, we verify the correctness of computable samplers for the uniform, Gaussian, and Laplace distributions, as well as a library for exact real arithmetic for working with generated samples. All of the results in this paper have been verified in the Rocq proof assistant.

Rust’s novel type system has proved an attractive target for verification and program analysis tools, due to the rich guarantees it provides for controlling aliasing and mutability. However, fully understanding, extracting and exploiting these guarantees is subtle and challenging: existing models for Rust’s type checking either support a smaller idealised language disconnected from real-world Rust code, or come with severe limitations in terms of precise modelling of Rust borrows, composite types storing them, function signatures and loops. In this paper, we present Place Capability Graphs : a novel model of Rust’s type-checking results, which lifts these limitations, and which can be directly calculated from the Rust compiler’s own programmatic representations and analyses. We demonstrate that our model supports over 97% of Rust functions in the most popular public crates, and show its suitability as a general-purpose basis for verification and program analysis tools by developing promising new prototype versions of the existing Flowistry and Prusti tools.

Differential privacy (DP) has become the gold standard for privacy-preserving data analysis, but implementing it correctly has proven challenging. Prior work has focused on verifying DP at a high level, assuming either that the foundations are correct or that a perfect source of random noise is available. However, the underlying theory of differential privacy can be very complex and subtle. Flaws in basic mechanisms and random number generation have been a critical source of vulnerabilities in real-world DP systems. In this paper, we present SampCert, the first comprehensive, mechanized foundation for executable implementations of differential privacy. SampCert is written in Lean with over 12,000 lines of proof. It offers a generic and extensible notion of DP, a framework for constructing and composing DP mechanisms, and formally verified implementations of Laplace and Gaussian sampling algorithms. SampCert provides (1) a mechanized foundation for developing the next generation of differentially private algorithms, and (2) mechanically verified primitives that can be deployed in production systems. Indeed, SampCert’s verified algorithms power the DP offerings of Amazon Web Services, demonstrating its real-world impact. SampCert’s key innovations include: (1) A generic DP foundation that can be instantiated for various DP definitions (e.g., pure, concentrated, Rényi DP); (2) formally verified discrete Laplace and Gaussian sampling algorithms that avoid the pitfalls of floating-point implementations; and (3) a simple probability monad and novel proof techniques that streamline the formalization. To enable proving complex correctness properties of DP and random number generation, SampCert makes heavy use of Lean’s extensive Mathlib library, leveraging theorems in Fourier analysis, measure and probability theory, number theory, and topology.

We present Tachis, a higher-order separation logic to reason about the expected cost of probabilistic programs. Inspired by the uses of time credits for reasoning about the running time of deterministic programs, we introduce a novel notion of probabilistic cost credit. Probabilistic cost credits are a separation logic resource that can be used to pay for the cost of operations in programs, and that can be distributed across all possible branches of sampling instructions according to their weight, thus enabling us to reason about expected cost. The representation of cost credits as separation logic resources gives Tachis a great deal of flexibility and expressivity. In particular, it permits reasoning about amortized expected cost by storing excess credits as potential into data structures to pay for future operations. Tachis further supports a range of cost models, including running time and entropy usage. We showcase the versatility of this approach by applying our techniques to prove upper bounds on the expected cost of a variety of probabilistic algorithms and data structures, including randomized quicksort, hash tables, and meldable heaps. All of our results have been mechanized using Coq, Iris, and the Coquelicot real analysis library.

Probabilistic programs often trade accuracy for efficiency, and thus may, with a small probability, return an incorrect result. It is important to obtain precise bounds for the probability of these errors, but existing verification approaches have limitations that lead to error probability bounds that are excessively coarse, or only apply to first-order programs. In this paper we present Eris, a higher-order separation logic for proving error probability bounds for probabilistic programs written in an expressive higher-order language. Our key novelty is the introduction of error credits , a separation logic resource that tracks an upper bound on the probability that a program returns an erroneous result. By representing error bounds as a resource, we recover the benefits of separation logic, including compositionality, modularity, and dependency between errors and program terms, allowing for more precise specifications. Moreover, we enable novel reasoning principles such as expectation-preserving error composition, amortized error reasoning, and error induction. We illustrate the advantages of our approach by proving amortized error bounds on a range of examples, including collision probabilities in hash functions, which allow us to write more modular specifications for data structures that use them as clients. We also use our logic to prove correctness and almost-sure termination of rejection sampling algorithms. All of our results have been mechanized in the Coq proof assistant using the Iris separation logic framework and the Coquelicot real analysis library.

In this paper, we study the existence and stability of multiple spikes pattern to the fractional Gierer–Meinhardt model with periodic boundary conditions and the fractional power [Formula: see text]. Specifically, we rigorously establish the existence of symmetric multiple spikes and asymmetric two-spikes solutions by the classical Lyapunov–Schmidt reduction method. We also investigate the stability of the constructed solution by studying its associated large and small eigenvalue problems, where we need to consider two nonlocal eigenvalue problems in their fractional versions. In the study of the large eigenvalue problem, the quantity [Formula: see text] is the critical threshold which determines the stability of [Formula: see text]-peaked solutions. For the symmetric two-spikes pattern we obtain the asymptotic expansion for the critical threshold [Formula: see text] up to the second order. Moreover, we provide some elementary properties of the Green’s function, including the first and second derivatives, they are linked to the location of the spikes and the stability. Among these properties on the Green’s function, we find out that the polygamma function [Formula: see text] plays a crucial role.