A key feature in trusted computing is attestation, which allows encapsulated components (enclaves) to prove their identity to (local or remote) distrusting components. Reasoning about software that uses the technique requires tracking how trust evolves after successful attestation. This process is security-critical and non-trivial, but no existing formal verification technique supports modular reasoning about attestation of enclaves and their clients, or proving end-to-end properties for systems combining trusted, untrusted and attested code. We contribute Cerisier, the first program logic for modular reasoning about trusted, untrusted and attested code, fully mechanized in the Iris separation logic and the Rocq Prover. We formalize a recent proposal, CHERI-TrEE, to extend capability machines with enclave primitives, as an extension to the Cerise capability machine and program logic. Our program logic comes with a universal contract for untrusted code, which captures both capability safety and local enclave attestation. Like Cerise, this universal contract is phrased in terms of a logical relation defining capabilities’ authority. We demonstrate Cerisier by proving end-to-end properties for three representative applications of trusted computing: secure outsourced computation, mutual attestation and a modeled trusted sensor component.

Some advantages of Cubical Type Theory, as implemented by Cubical Agda, over intensional Martin-Löf Type Theory include Quotient Inductive Types (QITs), which exist as instances of Higher Inductive Types, and functional extensionality, which is provable in Cubical Type Theory. However, HoTT features an infinite hierarchy of equalities that may become unwieldy in formalisations. Fortunately, QITs and functional extensionality are both preserved even if the equality levels of Cubical Type Theory are truncated to only homotopical Sets (h-Sets). In other words, removing the univalence axiom from Cubical Type Theory and instead postulating a conflicting axiom: the Uniqueness of Identity Proofs (UIP) postulate. Since univalence is proved in Cubical Type Theory from the so-called Glue Types, therefore, it is known that one can first remove the Glue Types (thus removing univalence) and then set-truncate all equalities (essentially assuming UIP), à la XTT. The result is a “h-Set Cubical Type Theory” that retains features such as functional extensionality and QITs.

However, in Cubical Agda, there are currently only two unsatisfying ways to achieve h-Set Cubical Type Theory. The first is to give up on the canonicity of the theory and simply postulate the UIP axiom, while the second way is to use a standard result stating “type formers preserve h-levels” to manually prove UIP for every defined type. The latter is, however, laborious work best suited for an automatic implementation by the proof assistant. In this project, we analyse formulations of UIP and detail their computation rules for Cubical Agda, and evaluate their suitability for implementation. We also implement a variant of Cubical Agda without Glue, which is already compatible with postulated UIP, in anticipation of a future implementation of UIP in Cubical Agda.

A capability machine is a type of CPU allowing fine-grained privilege separation using capabilities , machine words that represent certain kinds of authority. We present a mathematical model and accompanying proof methods that can be used for formal verification of functional correctness of programs running on a capability machine, even when they invoke and are invoked by unknown (and possibly malicious) code. We use a program logic called Cerise for reasoning about known code, and an associated logical relation, for reasoning about unknown code. The logical relation formally captures the capability safety guarantees provided by the capability machine. The Cerise program logic, logical relation, and all the examples considered in the paper have been mechanized using the Iris program logic framework in the Coq proof assistant. The methodology we present underlies recent work of the authors on formal reasoning about capability machines [Georges et al. 2021 ; Skorstengaard et al. 2019a ; Van Strydonck et al. 2022 ], but was left somewhat implicit in those publications. In this paper we present a pedagogical introduction to the methodology, in a simpler setting (no exotic capabilities), and starting from minimal examples. We work our way up to new results about a heap-based calling convention and implementations of sophisticated object-capability patterns of the kind previously studied for high-level languages with object-capabilities, demonstrating that the methodology scales to such reasoning.